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In this Article, we assess the role that the aggregation of citizen preferences
into the foreign policy choices of a democratic country might play in the
legitimization of international law. After addressing some of the theoretical
and empirical issues of such an approach, we use a variation of an anticipated
reaction model to show that even in large democracies there are mechanisms
through which citizen preferences can be and are reflected in the policy choices
of their representatives. Incumbents and candidates for public office take
policy positions in hopes of maximizing their future election chances. Although
policymakers each have their own personal policy preferences, those
preferences must be balanced against those of the electorate to optimize the
prospects for future election. Rational, well-informed policymnakers anticipate
future electoral consequences of public opinion and adjust their present policy
positions accordingly. We then discuss the implications of such an approach
for the principle of subsidiarity and the participation of states in multilateral
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institutions, in particular the International Monetary Fund. We argue that
there is reason to believe that citizen preferences remain relevant in decisions
whether to centralize or decentralize and in decisions whether a state will
support or undermine the mission of international institutions. Those
preferences must be considered as those institutions make their own
substantive and procedural choices.
1. INTRODUCTION
The current international economic crisis underscores the difficult
problem of the legitimacy of international law, as decisions made on the
international level impact individuals, families, and communities worldwide.
There have been several responses to this challenge.' Among them is the
claim that the legitimacy problem is ameliorated to the extent that a nation
state enjoys a democratic form of government, in which citizens have some
say in the adoption of laws and. regulations that bind them. This Article
explores one aspect in which that claim is true by modeling situations in
which the preferences of citizens in a democracy are reflected in the decisions
of policymakers, who then try to influence decisions on the international
level. This Article acknowledges the theoretical and empirical limitations of
this approach. Nonetheless, there is value in describing formally what a
number of scholars have observed, that at times, foreign policy issues become
sufficiently important to citizens that policymakers must consider the
preferences of even diffuse citizen groups when they formulate and advance
solutions to various international issues. This observation, of course, is only
half of the equation since the mere fact that citizens have some impact on
foreign policy decisions on the national level could mean little when decision-
making moves to the international level. Nevertheless, understanding what
happens within a democratic state serves as a starting point from which to
assess what happens as states interact and try to influence international
decisions.
This Article consists of three substantive parts. In Part II, it describes the
underlying legitimacy problem and situates, within an array of possible
responses, the democratic state's answer to that problem. Certain replies to
the legitimacy problem rely on the state as the intermediary through which
consent to be bound by international law and accountability by international
bodies to citizens occur. It is appropriate then to ask whether such consent
and accountability represent, in any meaningful way, actual citizen
preferences about such issues. If they do, the democratic state is a relatively
strong response to the legitimacy problem.
The remainder of Part II identifies and discusses theoretical and
empirical challenges of such an approach. Among these challenges are the
limits of an aggregative understanding of democracy, and concerns whether
ISee infra notes 4-.
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the public has any interest in foreign policy matters and whether leaders
respond to the public in any case. Such limits and concerns are significant.
However, with respect to aggregation, there are reasonable responses to
challenges to the basic assumptions of any social- maximizing approach,
including beliefs about human behavior and the formal problems raised by
collective action. Furthermore, although legitimacy has several facets, one
powerful claim is that legitimate governments are those that respond to the
wishes of their citizens. With regard to citizen impact, our review of the
literature indicates that although the public often leaves foreign policy
matters to elected leaders and experts, there are times when the public does
care about foreign policy. Under such circumstances, elected officials often do
respond to that concern.
In Part III, this Article makes a more formal argument by adopting an
anticipated reaction model, which describes policymakers' decisions in
relation to the preferences of voters. The model that this Article adopts
assumes that, as rational actors, policymnakers make policy decisions with the
expectation of maximizing future election chances. While policymnakers have
their own personal policy preferences, those preferences must be balanced
against those of the electorate. Thus, whether out of political expediency or
out of a desire to represent the interests of their constituents, rational and
well-informed policymnakers anticipate the future electoral consequences of
public opinion and adjust their present policy positions accordingly.
In Part IV, this Article explores some of the implications of the model and
directions for further research. With regard to the latter, the most important
task-expressing formally how norms might be adopted at the international
level after a democratic state adopts its own norms through the process
described here-must be left for another time. However, at this point, this
Article argues that, at a minimum, the model has implications for two areas
of international law. First, a model that takes seriously the possibility for
citizen impact on foreign affairs helps better assess subsidiarity, which itself
has been proposed as a criterion for the legitimacy of international law.
Second, such a model lends support to arguments for broad state
participation in multilateral organizations and in other international
governing bodies.
II. DEMOCRATIC STATES AS A "SOLUTION" TO THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT
A. The Problem and Its Solutions
Over the past two decades, it has been so widely accepted that democracy
is the primary source of legitimacy of government and of law that some
scholars speak of an emerging international right to democracy. 2 As this
2 See, e.g., Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 Am. J. INT'L L. 46
(1992); Amartya Sen, Democracy as a Universal Value, 10 J. DEMOCRACY 3 (1999). For a
Spring 20101 421
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consensus was emerging, the scope of international law was already
expanding both its reach and penetration into areas traditionally reserved to
states. These two trends raise a troubling question: if democracy is the
primary source of the legitimacy of government and law, what does this mean
about the legitimacy of international law arising from institutions and
methods of governance that can be far from democratic? As Kumm puts it:
Citizens find themselves in a double bind: the meaning of
participation in the democratic process on the domestic level
is undermined as international law increasingly limits the
realm in which national self-government can take place. At
the same time, there are no comparable democratic
institutions and practices established on the international
level. 3
In a recent paper, Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik reviewed three
conventional responses to the legitimacy problem, two of which are
significant here.4 The first response, based on legitimacy derived from
accountability, argues that policy decisions made by international
multilateral institutions are "directly accountable to [their] member states,
and thus indirectly accountable to publics in the democracies among them."5
Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik point out that multilateral institutions
have limited coercive powers compared to states, are largely controlled by
national governments through appointments to such institutions, require
supermajority votes, consensus or unanimity to act, and require national
implementation of policies.6 In this view, such "mechanisms add to a high
level of accountability, albeit mostly indirect, and render the arbitrary
exercise of power by international institutions far less likely."7
The second response, grounded in consent theory, argues that the power
given to multilateral institutions has been "delegated democratically and
relatively recent review of the literature, see Jan Wouters, Bart De Meester & Cedric Ryngaert,
Democracy and International Law (Leuven Interdisciplinary Research Group on Int'l
Agreements & Dev., Working Paper No. 5, 2004).
3Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of
Analysis, 15 EuR. J. INVL L. 907, 912-13 (2008). For general discussions of the issue, see ALFRED
C. AmAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW REFORM (2004);
Paul B. Stephan, International Governance and American Democracy, 1 CHI. J. INT L L. 237
(2000).
4 Robert 0. Keohane, Stephen Macedo & Andrew Moravcsik, Democracy-Enhancing
Multilateralism 5-6 (Inst. for Int'l Law & Justice, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No.
2007/4, 2007), available at http://www.jhfc.duke.edu/ducis/GlobalEquity/documents/Keohane-pap
er.pdf.
5 Id. at 5 (emphasis removed).
6Id. at 5-7.
7 Id. at 8.
Vol. 19:419422
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could . . . be rescinded that way."8 According to this view, ratification
processes on the domestic level provide ample room for democratic
deliberation and governments often retain the right to withdraw from
international institutions. Thus, it is arguable that citizens indirectly give
their consent to international exercises of power through their national
governments. 9
Both the accountability-based and consent-based responses to the
legitimacy problem view the state as an intermediary between citizens of a
democracy on the one hand and international institutions on the other,
through which accountability and consent flow. But if these models are to
have legitimizing force, one should be able to trace a line between the choices
of citizens through the state, and then on to decisions made on the
international level. As Kumm puts it, "from the perspective of citizens in a
constitutional democracy, [the state] is just the institutional framework
within which citizens govern themselves."10
To be sure, for Kumm and others, the connection is tenuous-either
because of the waning influence of states on the international level11 or
because of an apparent inability of citizens to influence political decisions on
the domestic level, let alone on the international level. Therefore, one must
8 Id. The third general response that the authors describe is that international law is justified
out of necessity, i.e., that some issues can be addressed effectively only at the international level
is its own justification. Keohane, Macedo & Moravcsik. supra note 4, at 6-7. But see J.H.H.
Weller, The Geology of International Law-Governance Democracy and Legitimacy, 64
HEIDELBERG J. INVL L. 547, 562 (2004) ("That a legitimacy powerfully skewed to results and
away from process, based mostly on outputs and only to a limited degree on inputs, is a weak
legitimacy and sometimes none at all.").
9Keohane, Macedo & Moravcsik, supra note 4, at 5-6. Indeed, Guzman and Landsidle argue that
the actual amount of state delegation of authority to international bodies is quite modest.
Andrew T. Guzman & Jennifer Landsidle, The Myth of International Delegation, 96 CAL. L. REV.
1693, 1694 (2008).
10 Kumm, supra note 3, at 910. J.L. Brierly shares this view: "[States ... are merely institutions,
that is to say, organizations which men establish among themselves for securing certain objects.
... They have no wills except the wills of the individual human beings who direct their affairs,.
..1J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 126 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963). Kurem is
primarily interested in the growing influence of multilateral institutions at the expense of states,
because "[alnything that imposes constraints on states also imposes constraints on citizens and
how they govern themselves." Kumm, supra note 3, at 910.
11 Kumm argues that changes in three dimensions of international law have led to a form of
international governance that "blurs the distinction between national and international law,"
and implies greater constraints on states and thus their citizens. Kumm, supra note 3, at 915.
First, the subject matter of international law has expanded from discrete, technical matters with
little political salience to areas that matter a great deal to citizens, such as human rights and the
environment. Id. at 913. Second, international law, although grounded in consent based treaties,
is increasingly generated by quasi- legislative or quasi-judiciary bodies that are contemplated by
those treaties, but largely beyond an individual state's control. Id. at 914. Third, states have less
flexibility in the interpretation and enforcement of international law, in part because of the
greater specificity of international obligations and the greater use of third party dispute
resolution. Id. at 914.
423
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look for other models of legitimacy that do not rely as much on the state's role
in the process. 12 Yet, the state remains an important actor in the creation of
international law. Thus, it is worth asking what it might mean for the state
to be the mechanism through which citizens engage in self-governance, even
with regard to international matters. 13 This involves a two-fold question: the
first is the extent to which citizens can influence foreign policy decisions
made at the domestic level; the second is the extent to which that influence
makes its way up to the international level. The purpose of this Article is to
focus on the first part of the question and leave the second for future work.
B. Aggregating Preferences in a Democracy
One way to assess the degree to which citizens do engage in self-
governance in international affairs is to examine the extent to which citizens'
points of view or preferences on particular issues are reflected in foreign
policy decisions made at the national level. This is one manifestation of an
important democratic principle: "[When binding decisions are made, the
claims of each citizen as to the laws, rules, policies, etc. to be adopted must be
counted as valid and equally valid."'14
At the outset, this Article acknowledges that an approach based on
aggregating and mapping citizen preferences onto public policy or law has its
limits, and that there is a strong argument that individual and collective
human experience is too rich to be explained as simply doing what one
12 These commentators represent a fourth response to the legitimacy question. This response
examines whether the decision-making processes and outcomes occurring on the international
level would be considered legitimate had they occurred on the domestic level. Kumm, for
example, proposes four constitutional principles that form a framework for assessing the
legitimacy of international law: the first is a rebuttable presumption that international law is
legitimate. Id. at 918. That presumption can he overridden if one of the remaining three
principles-subsidiarity, adequate participation and accountability, and reasonable outcomes-
are grossly violated. Kumm, supra note 3, at 920, 924, 927. A similar approach can be found in
the work of Thomas Franck, for whom fairness is the ultimate legitimizing force. See generally
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990); THOMAS M. FRANCK,
FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTI'TUTIONS (1995). On a more functional level, some
commentators question the extent to which international institutions perform the functions that
democracies do on the domestic level: offsetting factions, protecting minority rights, and
improving the quality of democratic deliberation. See Keohane, Macedo & Moravcsik, supra note
4.
13 This approach reflects Putnam's understanding of international interaction as a two-level
game, one on the domestic level and the other on the international level. See generally Robert D.
Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT. ORG. 427
(1988).
14 ROBERT A. DAHLf, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 105 (1989). Dahl doubts that international
organizations can be democratic. See Robert A. Dahl, Can International Organizations Be
Democratic? A Skeptic's View, in DEMOCRACY's EDGES 19 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordon
eds., 1999) [hereinafter Can International Organizations Be Democratic?].
424 Vol. 19:419
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prefers.' 5 Dryzek, in support of a deliberative approach to democracy,
discusses several theoretical problems raised by an aggregative approach. He
points out that the rational choice theorist's view-that individuals, whether
they are citizens or their representatives, are egoists who seek to maximize
their own utility-is ultimately an unverifiable assumption about human
nature. 16 Another (and in Dryzek's view, the far more difficult) challenge is
posed by social choice theorists who ask whether, no matter what
assumptions one might make about human nature, any aggregation of
individual preferences into a single social policy can ever be formally
coherent, short of disproportionate influence by powerful groups or
dictatorship. 17 Finally, there is the challenge from Dryzek and other
deliberative theorists, who argue that it is possible for citizens to change each
other's preferences through deliberation; whereas both rational choice and
social choice theorists argue that an individual's preference set remains
independent throughout the process of political interaction. 18
It would take more space than available here to respond thoroughly to
each of these concerns. However, it remains worthwhile to use an aggregative
approach based on an individual's maximization of preferences for several
reasons. As an initial matter, although much of the literature on cooperative
behavior assumes an egoist seeking to maximize utility, it is equally possible
to view altruistic, other-regarding behavior as a set of preferences that can be
expressed by a utility function that is then maximized.' 9 For example, a
person's opposition to the use of land mines out of concern for others who
could be harmed by such weapons can be framed in terms of preferences that
one would want to see embodied in foreign policy. Therefore, a preference-
maximizing approach need not be tied to particular assumptions about the
selfishness or generosity of human beings.
15 Without further explanation, the concept can become useless. Taken too broadly, to say that
people do what they prefer provides little predictive power. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S.
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1067-68 (2000).
16 JOHN S. DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND: LIBERALS, CRITICS, CONTESTATIONS
33-34 (2000).
17 Id. at 34-36.
18 Id. at 32, 34.
19 As an example of the debate among evolutionary game theorists, Binmore bases a system of
large-scale cooperative behavior on a self-regarding individual. See generally KEN BINMORE,
NATURAL JUSTICE (2005). Gintis, on the other hand, argues that long-term cooperative behavior
is better explained though persons who are other-regarding. See Herbert Gintis, Behavioral
Ethics Meets Natural Justice, 5 POL., PHIL. & ECON. 5, 7 (2006); see also James Andreoni & John
Miller, Giving According to Garp: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for
Altruism, 70 ECONOMETRICA, 737, 749-50 (2002) (stating that subjects showing an interest in
altruistic behavior can be shown to adhere to the axioms of revealed preference, which implies
that a continuous and convex utility function could have generated such choices).
Spring 2010] 425
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Dryzek is right that the collective action problem posed by social choice
theorists is the more daunting challenge. The Impossibility Theorem, first
articulated by Arrow, states that it is impossible to devise any system of
mapping individual preferences onto a social welfare function, while at the
same time satisfying relatively modest conditions one would assume should
be part of any acceptable group decision-making process.20 Much of the
subsequent work in social choice theory has responded to the Impossibility
Theorem by relaxing one or more of the conditions imposed by Arrow. 21 As
Dryzek points out, one reaction to the theorem has been to reject as nonsense
the concept of the will of the people; as a consequence, voting systems, at
best, enable persons to get rid of tyrants who impose their own social
orderings onto the polity.22 Others do not go so far. Dryzek himself argues
that deliberation has the effect of limiting the range of preference orderings,23
either by stipulating in advance what that range will be or by eliminating,
through deliberation, preference orderings that cannot be defended in public
through comprehensible reasons.24 What is important, for the purposes of
this Article, is that the literature indicates there are plausible relaxations of
20 KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 24 (2d ed. 1963). Arrow proposes
several conditions. First, every set of possible preference orderings should be admissible. Id. at
24. Second, there should be a positive relationship between social orderings and individual
preferences; if every individual's preference for a particular state rises, one should see it rise in
any corresponding social ordering. Id. at 25-26. Third, any social ordering should be independent
of irrelevant alternatives. Id. at 26-27. To use Arrow's illustration, if officials in an election are
to be determined. by individual lists of preferred candidates, should one of the candidates die
before the election, her name should be taken off the list and only the preferences with respect to
the remaining candidates should be taken into account. Id. at 26. Fourth, there should be
unanimity: the social welfare function representing citizens' preferences should not be imposed
on anyone. ARROW, supra, at 29. Finally, there should be no dictatorship; that is, there should be
no one person whose preferences are the sole basis for the choices made by a society. Id. at 30.
Arrow goes on to show formally that no majority voting system can satisfy all these conditions.
Id. at 46-59.
21 For a nontechnical discussion of the major responses to Arrow's theory, see generally Amartya
Sen, The Possibility of Social Choice, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 349 (1999). On the significance of Sen's
contribution to the literature, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K Sen's Contributions to the Study
of Social Welfare, 101 SCANDINAVIA J. ECON. 163 (1999). According to Arrow, one of Sen's several
contributions is his demonstration that even in situations where several of Arrow's conditions
are relaxed, even modest Pareto-based decisions cannot be reconciled with a strongly held liberal
belief that individuals should have freedom to choose particular outcomes. Id. at 165-66. The
relevant work is Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152
(1970) [hereinafter The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal].
22 DRYZEK, supra note 16, at 35 (discussing WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND) THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE
(1982)). The absence of a dictator is one of the conditions imposed by Arrow. See ARROW, supra
note 20, at 29
23 Another condition posed by Arrow is an unlimited set of individual preferences. ARROW, supra
note 20, at 24.
24 DRYZEK, supra note 16, at 42-47. As a consequence, deliberation relaxes the condition of
unlimited preference orderings, thus enabling coherent social decisions. See id.
426
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one or more of the conditions posed by Arrow so that it is meaningful to speak
of an aggregation of citizen preferences.
We also take seriously the possibility that citizens' preferences can
change through a process of debate and persuasion by others and are
therefore not fixed, even during the policy formation process. However, as
Dryzek recognizes at some point political decisions are made on the basis of
elections, committee votes, or through some other decision-making process,25
at or by which time a snapshot of citizen preferences will be or have been
taken and viewed as fixed, even though in reality such preferences can
change almost immediately thereafter. 26 In Part III, this Article argues that
rational elected officials will anticipate future public opinion about foreign
policy matters and indeed might try to influence that opinion. Even so, such
an approach involves guessing what that opinion will be, in effect taking a
future snapshot of citizen preferences at some future election time. This
means an aggregative approach does not preclude understandings of
democracy, which allow preferences to change.27
Finally, in addition to the theoretical issues just addressed, this Article
acknowledges that legitimacy involves more than government reflection of
citizen preferences. 28 Bekkers and Edwards argue that democratic legitimacy
can be assessed in three broad areas. First, one must assess opportunities for
citizen participation in the process, the quality of representation, and the
openness in setting the agenda. 29 Second, one needs to judge how collective
decision-making is actually carried out in practice, the quality of
participation, the amount of transparency, and the presence of checks and
balances in the decision-making process.30 For Bekkers and Edwards, it is
only in the third assessment area, which they call output legitimacy, that one
25 Id. at 38-39. This is what causes Dryzek to turn his focus away from voting systems and
toward collective choice through consensus- building and non-electoral means of responding to
voters. Id. at 47-56.
26 Hence, the reluctance to hold a runoff vote after a close election. Not only can citizen
preferences change over time, but citizens can misremember what their preferences were before
a political decision was made. See Mark R. Joslin, The Determinants and Consequences of Recall
Error About Gulf War Preferences, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 440, 444 (2003).
27 See also AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 310 (2002) ('To ask what ... the social
choice should be (or would be) given the profile of individual preferences does not amount to
taking individual preferences as 'given' in the sense of assuming them to be unchanging or
unalterable."). When preferences change after a decision has been made, the question becomes
whether it would be better for society to remain in repose or to reconsider that prior decision.
28 This Article also acknowledges that democracy involves more as well. See infra text
accompanying notes 90-91 and 111-12.
29 This is what Bekkers and Edwards term "input legitimacy." Victor Bekkers & Arthur
Edwards, Legitimacy and Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Assessing Governance
Practices, in GOVERNANCE AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT: ASSESSING THE DEMOCRATIC
LEGITIMACY OF GOVERNANCE PRACTICES 35, 43-44 (Victor Bekkers et al. eds., 2008).
30 This is termed "throughput legitimacy." Id. at 44-45.
427Spring 2010]
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expressly asks whether government policy has been responsive to the
expressed wishes of the people.3' Even in terms of outcomes, they argue, one
must also assess the degree to which such outcomes contribute to remedying
collective action problems and whether there is accountability to citizens for
such outcomes.32
Legitimacy thus has many criteria. Yet, several of the criteria that
Bekkers and Edwards identify are designed to increase government
responsiveness to the wishes of its people. The criterion of who may vote is
obvious in this respect, as is who may determine the agenda for political
discussion and decision. The same is true at the output end of the process. As
Keohane notes, accountability can exist in many forms of organization,
democratic or otherwise, with accountability taking several forms itself.3 3 To
use Keohane's framework,3 4 when voters in a democracy authorize and
reauthorize their representatives to wield power on their behalf, one of the
normative claims they make on such representatives is that they should
carry out the wishes of their constituents. Citizens may make additional
normative claims on their representatives (for example, by insisting that they
adopt policies that work in the pragmatic sense) but responsiveness to citizen
demands will always remain one of the most powerful of those claims.
C. The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy
In his 1992 review of the literature on public control over foreign affairs,
Holsti wrote of the challenges to an earlier consensus that had emerged in
the decade following World War II and had solidified by the early 1960s.3 5
That consensus, represented by scholars .and commentators such as Almond
and Lippmann, 36 was skeptical about the public's role in foreign policy. In
their view, to the extent that the public had any interest in foreign affairs
issues, two flaws prevented public opinion from being of any use to
policymnakers. First, such opinion was too volatile.37 Second, public opinion
lacked any structure and coherence, so much so that public attitudes about
31 Id. at 45.
32 Id. at 45-46.
33 Robert 0. Keohane, The Concept of Accountability in World Politics and the Use of Force, 24
MICH. J. INVL L. 1121, 1123-27, 1130-34 (2003).
34 Id. at 1124-27.
35 OLE R. HOLSTI, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann
Consensus, reprinted in MAKING AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 55, 61 (2006) [hereinafter Public
Opinion and Foreign Policy].
36 See generally GABRIEL ALMOND, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND FOREIGN POLICY (1950); WALTER
LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION (1922); see also THOmAs BAILEY, THE MAN IN THE STREET: THE
IMPACT OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION ON FOREIGN POLICY (1948).
37 See BAILEY, supra note 36, at 167 ('The mass mood, when it fluctuates violently, is more likely
to do so regarding foreign affairs than domestic affairs.").
428 Vol. 19:419
HeinOnline  -- 19 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 428 2010-2011
Spring 20101ATTERS OF PR FERENCE42
foreign policy "might be best described as 'non-attitudes."' 38 In any event, the
public was thought to have little, if any, impact on the conduct of foreign
policy.8 9
According to Hoisti, this consensus began to unravel by the end of the
1960s, 4 0 such that the current literature indicates a much more nuanced
understanding of the public's role in foreign affairs. Some studies have placed
public involvement in foreign affairs within a broader historical context, have
shown that the issue has existed since the founding of the republic, and point
out the times when there is in fact strong public interest in foreign affairs.41
Such studies began to show that, far from being volatile, the public's general
views on foreign policy tend to be consistent over time. 42
Holsti's own work confirms this influence exists. In a recent study, for
example, Hoisti uses pre and post-9/11 survey data to show that U.S. public
attitudes regarding whether the United States should be more involved in
foreign affairs or more isolationist have been relatively stable even in the
aftermath of that event. 43 Several other studies have questioned the claim
that public opinion on foreign affairs issues lacks coherence. For example,
with respect to both domestic and foreign issues, Erickson, MacKuen, and
Stimson show that when the electorate is viewed as a whole, as opposed to
individual voters, the public tends to exhibit highly rational forms of
anticipation and evaluation of its leadership's policy decisions and
38 Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, supra note 35, at 60.
39 Id. at 58.
40 Hoisti argues that the Vietnam War led some scholars to wonder whether experts were indeed
better than the public at making foreign policy decisions. Id. at 62. There were also questions
about the methodology of earlier studies, particularly with regard to polling methods. Id. at 63.
41 ERIC ALTERMAN, WHO SPEAKS FOR AMERICA? WHY DEMOCRACY MATTERS IN FOREIGN POLICY
13 (1998); RICHARD J. BARNET, ROCKETS' RED GLARE: WHEN AMERICA GOES TO WAR: THE
PRESIDENTS AND THE PEOPLE (1990) (both Alterman and Barnet trace the history of public
involvement in foreign affairs). Public interest and knowledge about foreign affairs could be
growing, albeit in channeled ways. Matthew Baum argues that by reducing the opportunity and
transaction costs of paying attention to foreign policy issues, the rise of soft news (news from
entertainment -oriented programming as opposed to strict news programs) has led to increasing,
although narrow, public awareness of foreign affairs. MATTHEW A. BAUM, SOFT NEWS GOES TO
WAR: PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NEW MEDIA AGE 5-6, 30-33
(2003). This development has led, in Baum's view, to a democratization of foreign policy. Id. at
282.
42 ALTERMAN, supra note 41, at 13.
43 OLE R. HOLSTI, A Return to Isolationism and Unilateralism?: American Public Opinion, Pre-
and Post-September 11, in MAKING AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 269, 303 (2006); see also
Alexander Todorov & Anesu N. Mandisova, Public Opinion on Foreign Policy: The Multilateral
Public that Perceives Itself as Unilateral, 68 PUB. OPINION Q. 323 (2004). Four surveys conducted
from June 1996 to February 2003 show no major changes in public attitudes towards the U.S.
role in the world. Id. at 329.
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performance.44 Other studies show that citizens who are informed about
foreign affairs tend to use the same thought processes as experts when
thinking about and reaching judgments about particular issues 45 and are no
more error prone than elites in that regard. 46
The literature also indicates that public opinion does in fact shape foreign
policy decisions when public opinion is viewed in very broad terms. As
Hartmann and Wendzel put it, "the public does have general views and
fundamental beliefs that policymakers will disregard at their peril."47 Such
foreign policy views can impact the results of elections both prospectively and
retroactively. 4 8 For example, competing popular understandings of national
identity4 9 lead to disagreement about the appropriate level of state
involvement in foreign affairs. 50
Accordingly, Holmes argues that public moods of introversion and
extroversion in foreign policy are a dominant force in American foreign policy.
According to Holmes, the President-who in Holmes' view has the most
impact on foreign policy affairs-is particularly sensitive to public mood in
this regard.51 Monroe, likewise, shows that for the years 1960-74 American
44 ROBERT S. ERIKSON, MICHAEL B. MACKUEN & JAMES A. STISON, THE MACRO POLITY 105-08
(2002).
45 Paul Goren, Political Sophistication and Policy Reasoning: A Reconsideration, 48 Am. J. POL.
SCI. 462, 471 (2004) (finding that both sophisticated and unsophisticated persons rely on beliefs
about militarism and comlmunism to establish preferences for military spending to the same
degree, although sophistication did play a role in shaping preferences about aid to the Contras).
46 BARNET, supra note 41, at 413; Steve Farkas & Will Friedman, Mixed Messages: A Survey of
the Foreign Policy Views of American Leaders 10 (Public Agenda, Working Paper, 1995) (finding
no major differences between the foreign policy goals of leaders who specialize in foreign affairs
and those who do not).
47 FREDERICK H. HARTMANN & ROBERT L. WENDZEL, AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN A CHANGING
WORLD 189 (1994). In this regard, Druckman argues that for citizens, the search costs of
selecting suitable frames for assessing and responding to foreign policy issues are prohibitively
high, which leads citizens to delegate to credible elites the task of sorting through such frames.
These frames serve as a rough set of controls over the elites because citizens will not allow their
leaders to arbitrarily choose frames that meet only the purposes of the elite. James N.
Druckman, On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?, 63 J. POL. 1041, 1045 (2001).
48 OLE R. HOSTI, PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 55-56 (2004) (discussing a
number of correlations, citing case studies that discuss the impact of public opinion on foreign
affairs issues on elections).
49 BARNET, supra note 41; Jack Citrin et al., Is American Nationalism Changing?: Implications
for Foreign Policy (Inst. of Gov't Studies, Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, Working Paper No. 94-12, 1994).
50 Citrin et al., supra note 49, at 46.
51 JACK E. HOLMES, THE MOOD/INTEREsT THEORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 2-3, 115 (1985);
Michael B. MacKuen, Political Drama, Economic Conditions, and the Dynamics of Presidential
Popularity, 27 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1983) (noting that foreign policy events account for 20
percent of the variation in presidential approval ratings). McAvoy shows, however, that public
evaluations of the President with regard to foreign policy vary as the public learns about
particular foreign policy issues through the media. Gregory E. McAvoy, Stability and Change:
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public opinion on foreign policy and foreign policy outcomes were consistent
92 percent of the time; moreover, changes in public opinion for domestic and
foreign issues and subsequent policy changes were congruent 66 percent of
the time.52 In a comparative study, Brooks and Manza also show that public
preferences influence policy outcomes among OECD democracies. 53
A possible causal link between public opinion and policy outcomes is
proposed by Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson.54 They posit that politicians
rationally anticipate the general public mood as to whether the government
should play a more or less active role in the political economy and reach their
own policy positions accordingly. 55 Individually, "[jp]oliticians . . . alter their
support for liberal and conservative policies, to accommodate changes in
public opinion and thus produce a clear dynamic linkage between what the
public wants and what politicians provide."56 As a result, when such policy
choices by individual politicians are aggregated, adjustments in policy tend to
follow public opinion.57 Erickson, MacKuen, and Stimson then empirically
examine the responsiveness of the House of Representatives, the Senate, the
President, and, even the Supreme Court, to shifts in public opinion.5 8 They
find that each of them does respond to public opinion-with the House the
most responsive and, as might be expected, the Supreme Court least
responsive.59 They also find that such governmental bodies respond relatively
quickly to shifts in public opinion.60 Such responses take the form of both
The Time Varying Impact of Economic and Foreign Policy Evaluations on Presidential Approval,
59 POL. RES. Q. 71, 81 (2006).
62 Alan D. Monroe, Consistency Between Public Preferences and National Policy Decisions, 7 Am.
POL. REs. 3, 10 (1979).
53 Clem Brooks & Jeff Manza, Social Policy Responsiveness in Developed Democracies, 71 Am.
Soc. REV. 474, 490 (2006).
54 ERIKSON, MACKUEN & STIMSON, supra note 44, at 338-39.
55 The composition (Democratic or Republican) of a given governing body also has an impact on
policy outcomes. Id. at 339.
56 Id. at 291. According to the authors, politicians are not the only players who rationally
anticipate the public mood: "Those who advance policy proposals-bureaucrats, lobbyists, judges,
and citizens-are concerned with what can be done successfully, be it an administrative act, a
judicial decision, or a legislative proposal." Id. For a general discussion of the roles of the press,
think tanks, advocacy groups, and other organizations and academia in foreign affairs, see DAVID
D. NEWSOM, THE PUBLIC DIMENSION OF FOREIGN POLICY (1996).
57 ERIKSON, MAcKUEN & STrISON, supra note 44, at 292.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 305-07, 310, 313. On the Supreme Court's responsiveness to public opinion, see Kevin T.
McGuire & James A. Stimsom, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited:- New Evidence on
Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018 (2004) (arguing that the
Supreme Court is highly responsive to public mood).
60 ERIKSON, MAcKUEN & STIMSON, supra note 44, at 319.
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greater political activity6' and the actual laws promulgated. 62 In turn,
according to these authors, public mood responds to the changes in policy,
thereby restarting the reiterative cycle. 63
The literature thus indicates that the public does in fact take foreign
policy positions, which in turn influence decision- makers. However, as
discussed, such opinions tend to concern broad attitudes regarding
government intervention, internationalism, or isolationism. Even if, from
time to time, the public becomes interested in and then influences specific
foreign policy issues,64 those instances could be rare.65 Therefore, it is a fair
question whether public influence, in the form of broad attitudes about the
61 Id.
62 Id. at 339.
63 Id. at 350-51. Such a system of course must be qualified. For example, politicians can
misperceive public opinion. Todorov and Mandisova show that "[w]hereas Americans have a
strong preference for multilateral policies, they underestimate public support for such policies
and overestimate public support for unilateral policies." Todorov & Mandisova, supra note 43, at
343. In this regard, Entman argues that the interplay between public opinion (actual or
perceived), the media, and foreign policy elites is so intertwined that it is difficult, if not
impossible, to determine the extent to which actual public opinion independently influences
foreign policy decisions. ROBERT M. ENTMAN, PROJECTIONS OF POWER: FRAMING NEWS, PUBLIC
OPINION, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 137-38 (2004). He writes:
[flt appears the media played a role in shaping outcomes, along with leaders'
talk, actions, and perceptions of public opinion, and the public's actual
sentiments. In this jumbled spiral, this double helix, of reciprocal influences,
movements, and resistances among elites and the public, evidence for the
independent influence of public opinion on policy, or for genuinely democratic
control of government by the public, is likely to remain incomplete.
Id. at 137. Finally, there is always the possibility that decision-makers will deliberately select
positions that go against the public grain. ERIKSON, MACKUEN & STIMSON, supra note 44, at 316.
Foyle argues that the influence of public opinion on foreign policy outcomes depends on what
decision-makers believe the role of the public should be and on the context in which the decision
needs to be made. DOUGLAS C. FOYLE, COUNTING THE PUBLIC IN: PRESIDENTS, PUBLIC OPINION,
AND FOREIGN POLICY 2-5 (1999).
64 Some scholars have argued that public opinion has influenced specific U.S. foreign policy
issues. For example, anticipated public opposition to an extended occupation influenced the
Truman Administration's occupation policy. H-AJRTMANN & WENDZEL, supra note 47, at 189-90.
Vietnam has also been identified as an issue in which public opinion was an important influence.
Id. at 189. But see ERIKSON, MACKUEN & STIMSON, supra note 44, at 306, 316 (showing data that
U.S. political leadership was actually unresponsive to public opinion during the Vietnam War).
See also Sara McLaughlin Mitchell & Will H. Moore, Presidential Uses of Force During the Cold
War: Aggregation, Truncation, and Temporal Dynamics, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 438, 446 (2002)
(arguing that international factors might be more important than domestic factors when the
President decides to use force).
65 Can International Organizations Be Democratic?, supra note 14, at 30. As Moravcsik puts it,
"In the real world, individual citizens suffer from a limited and unequal ability to devote time
and energy to learning about and engaging in politics. In the real world, citizens remain
I'rationally ignorant' or non-participatory with regard to most issues, most of the time." Andrew
Moravcsik, Is There a 'Democratic Deficit' in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis, 39 GOVT
& OPPOSITION 336, 344 (2004).
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role of government in the political economy or world affairs, with occasional
influence over more specific foreign policy issues, is "enough democracy" to
legitimate more specific policies or laws that eventually percolate up to the
international level.
For Dahl, the answer to that question is probably no-it is not enough
that the public either does not care in the first place or has delegated these
issues to elected leaders. This is because delegated decisions made under
those tepid circumstances might not reflect what would be the majority view,
had there been more information and deeper public engagement. Dahl argues
that all decisions by a democratic government lead to winners and losers
among citizens.66 Modern democracies try to resolve this dilemma by positing
some idea of the public good, either substantive or procedural. 67 However,
Dahl believes the public good is as "rationally contestable" on international
issues as on domestic questions, and there is "no reason to believe that the
views of elites are in some demonstrable sense objectively correct."68 This
raises the problem that an elite consensus and a lack of public interest could
lead to foreign policy decisions being made without adequate debate or
consideration. As Dahl explains, "if citizens had gained a better
understanding of their interests and if their views had then been more fully
developed, expressed, and mobilized, the decisions might have gone another
way."6
Moravcsik takes the opposite tack. For him, delegation to elites is a
realistic, albeit second best, solution that melds democratic ideals with
political reality.70 Such delegation is needed precisely because, like Dahl,
Moravcsik worries that diffuse public interest could lead to either ill-
considered decisions or decisions unduly influenced by powerful groups.7' He
notes that to counter this danger, citizens often insulate and delegate
authority to decision-makers for at least three reasons: to provide expertise in
complex areas; to protect minority rights by establishing those rights and
shielding from public influence certain decision-makers charged with
protecting those rights, such as courts; and finally to help redress imbalances
in power.72 Moravcsik points out that while each of these situations creates
66 Can International Organizations Be Democratic?, supra note 14, at 25.
67 Id. at 26-27. For a discussion of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of determining and
achieving the public good in large democracies, see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM,
SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY 250-56 (2nd ed. 1950). For Dahl's defense of the public good, see DAHL,
supra note 14, at 299-308.
68 Can International Organizations Be Democratic?, supra note 14, at 27.
69 Id.
70 Moravcsik, supra note 65, at 344.
71 Id. at 346.
72 Moravcsik, supra note 65, at 344-46.
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exceptions to direct democratic decision-making, "Ijiln each of these cases,
under many circumstances more insulated and delegated authority of...
governance structures might be thought of as more 'representative' of citizen
concerns precisely because they are less directly 'democratic. "'73
Therefore, whether one can characterize as democratic what the
literature observes-the general character of public interest in foreign affairs,
its diffuse nature, and the degree of influence such interest exerts over
foreign policymiaking-is ultimately a question of the glass being half empty
or half full. This is the case even when we understand democracy in terms of
consent and accountability. However, as long as policymakers select specific
policies that fall within those broad policy terms that the public has
contemplated, and as long as citizens do not subsequently object once they
become aware of these specific policy choices, then an argument can be made
that there has been public consent, even if, at a minimum, citizens have only
acquiesced to the policy decisions in question. 7" Put another way, the nature
of public opinion might be general, but the laws and other public policy
outcomes to which citizens react and for which the citizens hold their leaders
accountable are nevertheless quite specific. Thus, the connections between
the broad and the specific create a dynamic of consent and accountability. It
is concerning from a democratic perspective when the public takes a strong
position on a particular foreign policy matter and elected officials act
inconsistently with that position. Of course, this sometimes does happen, but
at least in theory, democratic systems are designed to correct such situations.
III. A MODEL OF CITIZEN PREFERENCES IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS DECISIONS
The impact of public opinion on foreign policy decisions discussed in the
preceding Part can be viewed with greater precision through more formal
modeling. In this Part, this Article adopts an anticipated reaction model,
developed by Bailey, which describes policy decisions in relation to the
preferences of voters, in either discrete or diffuse groups. 75 The model
73 Id. at 346-47 (emphasis removed). Indeed, Moravcsik goes on to argue: "[Tihere is no reason to
believe that a marginal increase in direct participation by the average citizen in majoritarian or
consensus decision -making, as opposed to delegation and insulation of policymnakers, promotes
outcomes that can be more easily justified in terms of normative and positive democratic theory."
Id. at 347. Thus, Moravcsik believes modern democracies enjoy a basic legitimacy from a
democratic standpoint and thus can serve as a baseline for assessing the legitimacy of
international organizations. If, for example, a modern democracy delegates decision-making
authority to a central bank because expertise is required, a similar grant to an international
financial institution should be viewed as legitimate. Id.
74 This justification assumes that the policymaking process is transparent enough that concerned
citizens can adequately inform themselves about policy decisions.
75 See Michael Bailey, Quiet Influence: The Representation of Diffuse Interests on Trade Policy,
1983-94, 26 LEG. STUD. Q. 45 (200 1). Although Bailey focuses on congressional decision -making,
there is no reason why the model would not also apply to any elected office. In his work, he shows
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assumes that as rational actors, incumbents and candidates for office take
policy positions in hopes of maximizing their future election chances. 76 The
model recognizes that while policymakers each have their own personal
policy preferenceS, 77 those preferences must be balanced against the
electorate's policy preferences to optimize the prospects for future election. 78
Thus whether it is for political expediency or with a sincere desire to
represent the interests of citizens, rational and well-informed policymakers
anticipate future electoral consequences of public opinion and adjust their
present policy positions accordingly. 79
Bailey's model incorporates a number of important concepts for the
purposes of this Article: voter utility, divergence between the preferences of
various actors, multiple issues, weighting, and uncertainty. First, voter
utility is used to measure a voter's satisfaction with particular policy
outcomes. Second, this Article assumes that a voter will have a personal
preference regarding a particular foreign or domestic policy issue, as will
policymakers, and those preferences might diverge. As a result, voter utility
decreases with increasing divergence between the voter's and the
policymaker's respective positions on specific issues. Third, since voters and
policymakers each have preferences with respect to a number of foreign and
domestic policy issues, total utility for an individual voter is negatively
related to the aggregate differences between a voter's preferred positions on
various issues and the corresponding positions expressed by policymakers.80
Fourth, Bailey's model recognizes that a voter might care more about some
issues than others and weigh them accordingly. 81 Finally, a voter might not
know for certain what her preferred position is with respect to particular
issues and thus, a voter's utility function 82 is subject to random shocks, which
that diffuse voter groups had an impact on votes on trade within the House of Representatives.
Id. at 64-7 1.
76 This is also the approach taken by Ericson, MacKuen, and Stimson. ERIKSON, MAcKUEN &
STIMSON, supra note 44, at 284, 287. While Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson's work focuses on
national mood, Bailey's work focuses on "how individual representatives respond to their
constituents." Bailey, supra note 75, at 50.
77 For example, a given policymaker's range of acceptable policy options is, to some extent,
determined and constrained by party affiliation. Thus, the distribution of acceptable positions of
one party will likely be arrayed to the left or right of the distributions for another party. See
ERIKSON, MACKUEN & STIMSON, supra note 44, at 288.
78 Id. at 287.
79 Id. at 284.
80 Bailey, supra note 75, at 47.
81 Id.
82 A utility function expresses the relationship between voter satisfaction (utility) and the
explanatory variables.
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are reflected mathematically in an error term, here designated as E,.83 Thus,
the utility of voter i can be represented as:
M
U, (Xk) ~ >L (X," -Xk ) 2 + E
m=1
Equation 1
where x k is an M-dimensional vector of policy positions 84 for policymaker k,
Yim is voter i's intensity of preferences on issue rn, 85 Xm is the personal
preference of voter i on dimension (or policy issue) M, Xk, is the policy
position taken by policymaker k on issue m, and E1 is the random error term
with mean 0 and variance Or2 . Because the variance of the error term
increases with voter uncertainty about a particular issue m, to the extent
that greater levels of information reduce voter uncertainty, the variance
decreases with greater information. 86
A policymnaker's optimal position will then take into account the mean
preferences of the various voting groups, weighted by the size, intensity, and
information levels of each group.87 Thus, the politically expedient policy
position on issue mn (represented by (9M)88 given N groups comprised of qj
voters with identical preferences is:
83 Bailey, supra note 75, at 48. An error term is used to capture variations in dependent variables
(in this case, voter utility) that are not explained by the independent variables in the model. The
variable Ej is randomly drawn from a known distribution with mean 0 and variance a 2. In this
model, variance increases with voter uncertainty about a particular issue. See id.
84 Representing policy positions in an M-dimensional vector, where each dimension represents a
particular policy issue, provides an analytical framework for identifying the multiple issues for
which policymakers are held accountable and for analyzing how those policy issues are weighed
against each other.
85 That is, how much the voter cares about issue m.
836 Bailey, supra note 75, at 48.
87 Id.
88 The set of 19m that maximizes the total utility, as defined by Equation 1, minimizes the sum of
squares of distances between vector 19 and vector Xi. Thus, the set of positions 0 is the closest to
all groups given their assigned weighting. While the Hotelling Location Theory predicts that a
candidate maximizes the chance of electoral success by moving to the ideological center, there is
general agreement that, in a probabilistic voting environment, the candidate's optimal position is
the weighted mean of voter preferences as represented in Equation 1. See Harold Hotelling,
Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41 (1929); Robert A. Bernstein, Directing Electoral Appeals
Away from the Center: Issue Position and Issue Salience, 48 POL. RES. Q. 479 (1995). For an
overview of the current debate concerning directional and proximity-based voting models, see
Jeffrey B. Lewis & Gary King, No Evidence on Directional us. Proximity Voting, 8 POL. ANALYSIS
21 (2000).
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N~ YimllhXzm
Equation 2
where, yim is voter i's intensity of preferences on issue m; Xim is the personal
ideal position of voter i on dimension m; and i is the standard deviation of
the random shock variable -j.
To simplify, the relationships represented in Equation 2 can be
represented graphically as shown in Figure 1 below. 89 Each of the two axes
represents positions available on issues 1 and 2, respectively. For the sake of
discussion, the scale on each axis can represent an increasing level of
conservatism. Each of the circles represents groups of voters that share the
same preference set on issues 1 and 2, which means that each of the voter
groups represented by each circle prefers the same policy positions and have
assigned the same relative weight to each of the two issues. Because we are
limited by what can be represented in a two-dimensional drawing, the size of
the circles represents the size of that group weighted by the intensity of the
group's preference for a particular pair of issues. Given that Xi is the optimal
set of policy positions that maximizes the utility function for a given
individual voter i, the metric distance between e (the politician's optimal
position) and Xi as represented by the line depicted in the figure, can be







0 20 40 60 80 100
Figure 1
89 While M issues are included in the voter utility function, for illustration purposes, here
Equation 1 is limited to only two issues. Imposing this restriction allows us to graphically
illustrate voter preferences along those two policy dimensions.
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This result can be analyzed to reflect changes in the number, size,
preferences, and information levels of the groups. For example, as a group's
size increases, the politically expedient policy position will move closer to that
group's preferred policy positions, as depicted in Figure 2 below. Here, the
original inner circle of group A has expanded (with intensity remaining
constant) and the expedient position for the politician has moved accordingly.
It so happened that, in this example, the democratic deficit from the
perspective of voter i has decreased, because the expanded group's preferred
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Figure 2
In addition to group size, preferences are weighted by voter intensity and
information levels. As a result, a well-informed small group with intense
preferences for a specific policy position can also pull the politically expedient
position toward that group's preferred position, even with the size of the voter
group remaining constant. 90 Thus, if that group's preferences are relatively
more conservative than the politically expedient position taken previously,
then an increase in the magnitude of preference intensity and the resulting
increase in advocacy would have the effect of increasing the size of circle B,
and accordingly, e' will be pulled toward a more conservative position,
increasing the democratic deficit for more liberal voters. Thus, the result is
that I1e' - XiI >6 - XiI , meaning that the democratic deficit for voter i has
increased, as illustrated in Figure 3:
9Bailey, supra note 75, at 48-49.
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Figure 3
As this Article alluded to above, movement from e to e' will not occur
merely because voters feel more strongly about a particular set of issues.
Such an increase in the intensity of preferences must either increase the
likelihood of voting or motivate the voter to actually expend resources-in
particular, time, money, or both-to influence either other voters' preferences
or policymnakers directly.
Both the model and the associated figures illustrate how voters and
policymnakers attempt to influence preferences and to anticipate what
preferences will be in the future. As discussed in Part II.B, an anticipated
reaction model allows for the possibility of a change in preferences. Here, this
shift can happen through voter activity, which seeks to either increase the
size of the group that shares those preferences or to increase the intensity of
the group's activity, which has the same gravitational effect. Alternatively,
the policymaker herself can try to shape voter preferences through any
number of methods such as giving speeches, advertizing, or holding townhall
meetings. All of this activity occurs with a view toward influencing what the
contours of the preference map will, at some future point, look like when the
voters have the opportunity to hold the policymaker accountable for the
foreign policy positions she takes.
There are a number of broader implications of this model. First, the
model shows how citizens' preferences are aggregated and considered in the
decision-making process. But it also shows the democratic deficit. Although in
this model, policymakers do take citizens' preferences into account, it is only
by coincidence that the policymakers' ultimate position will match exactly the
preferences of any particular individual or group of voters (as illustrated in
Figure 3 above). Statistically, a perfect match between personal preferences
on a myriad of issues, as opposed to only the two issues as illustrated above,
would be the equivalent of winning the lottery. This is another way of saying
that in a representative democracy no one necessarily gets his or her way.
It follows, therefore, that although the model demonstrates an aggregate
conception of democracy in which citizens' preferences are taken into account
in a meaningful way, it also shows the limitations, not of the model, but of
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the representative form of democracy. As Sen and others have pointed out,
liberal values require that there are times when a citizen has a right to get
her way. 91 Here we return to the problem of weighing the benefits gained
from participating in society against the loss of individual freedom. 92
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF A PREFERENCE-BASED MODEL OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
A description of how public opinion influences national-level foreign
policy decisions is only the first step in understanding the extent to which
consent-based and accountability-based arguments legitimize law made on
the international level. As noted in the Introduction, the fact that foreign
policy decisions reflect public opinion might mean little, as states interact
with other states, non-state actors, and multilateral institutions. The next
step would be to express formally how norms might be adopted at the
international level once a democratic state adopts its own norms through the
process described above. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this Article
to engage in that discussion. However, this Article will, at this point, explore
in a preliminary way the implications of the anticipated reaction model for
two areas of international law. First, a model that allows for citizen impact
on foreign affairs helps better assess the concept of subsidiarity as a criterion
for the legitimacy of international law. Second, such a model also strengthens
arguments for broadening, as much as possible, the participation of
democratic states in multilateral organizations and other international
governing bodies.
A. Subsidiarity
Subsidiarity is the principle of social organization that decisions should
be made at the lowest appropriate level of organization. The principle has
deep roots, having sprung into more recent form in Catholic social thought 93
91 The Impossibility a/a Paretian Liberal, supra note 21, at 152.
92 This Article discusses a related problem in the choice between centralization and
decentralization. See infra text accompanying notes 106-10.
93 LEO XIII, RERum NovARUM: ENCYCLICAL LE1TER ON THE CONDITION OF LABOR (1891),
reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 14, 35 (David J. O'Brien
& Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992). The concept finds expression in the papal encyclical Rerum
Novarum. Writing in 1891, Leo XIII contemplates a society comprised of various groups and
associations, each seeking some end. He writes,
Let the State watch over these societies of citizens united together in the
exercise of their right; but let it not thrust itself into their peculiar concerns
and their organization, for things move and live by the soul within them, and
they may be killed by the grasp of a hand from without.
Id. Forty years later. Pius XI develops the concept in a retrospective on Rerum Novarum. PIUS
XU, QUADRAGESIMO ANO (1931), in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE
42, 60. He writes, "[I]t is an injustice and .. . a grave evil and a disturbance of right order to
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and even more recently by its grafting into the constitutional framework of
the European Union.94 The concept has been justified on a number of bases.
The theological account of subsidiarity is grounded in the dignity of the
human person, who has capacities for inner growth and social living that
should be allowed to flourish without undue constraint from "higher" levels of
organization. 95 As an organizing principle for politics, subsidiarity is
similarly promoted as protecting political liberty, flexibility in response to
local conditions, identity, diversity, and a respect for the internal divisions
within members of a particular association. 96 Although the principle can be
understood as a preference for lower or smaller organizations, 97 in reality,
subsidiarity is neutral as to the level of organization; if a lower level of
government cannot better achieve particular desired ends, then it is
appropriate for a higher level to do So. 9
Subsidiarity has been proposed as an important principle in regulating 99
the relationship between the state and international law. Kummn argues that,
as applied to international law, the principle would recognize that modern
democratic states have well-established mechanisms for consent and
accountability. 100 These mechanisms for consent and accountability, in turn,
then weigh in favor of keeping a particular governmental function at the
state level. 101 At the same time, because the subsidiarity principle also moves
in the opposite direction, it legitimates international law when there are good
transfer to the larger and higher collectivity functions which can be performed and provided for
by lesser and subordinate bodies." Id.; see also PAUL VI, CAUDIiJM ET SPES: PASTORAL
CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD (1965), in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT:
THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 166, 217 ("Authorities must beware of hindering family, social, or
cultural groups, as well as intermediate bodies and institutions.").
94 Treaty on European Union and Final Act, art. G, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 31 I.L.M.
247, 257-58; Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on the European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, art. 5, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J.
(C 340) 1, 37 I.L.M. 56, 80-81.
95 Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law,
97 Am. J. INT'L L. 38, 42-43 (2003).
96 George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community
and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 332, 340-42 (1996).
97 See, e.g., the subsidiarity principle as stated by Popes Leo XIII, Pius XI, and Paul VI, supra
note 93.
98 Sjef Ederveen, George Gelauff & Jacques Pelkmans, Assessing Subsidiarity, in SUBSIDIARITY &
ECONOMIC REFORM IN EUROPE 19, 20 (George Gelauff, Isabel Cribo & Arjan Lejour eds., 2008)
('The subsidiarity principle involves a careful assessment of the optimal level at which decisions
should be taken, which can result in centralization but also in decentralization.").
99 As Bermann notes, subsidiarity can function in four ways: as a procedural guide to forming
legislation; as an interpretive guide such that courts would construe legislation to support the
principle; as a ground for invalidating legislation; and to build the confidence of the constituent
members of a particular group. Bermann, supra note 96, at 366--67.
100 Kumm, supra note 3, at 922.
101 Id.
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reasons for delegating issues to the international level.' 02 For Kumm, the
principle becomes important at the moment of delegation precisely because,
in his view, consent is lost on the international plane. He writes that "if
international law as governance is no longer grounded in the specific consent
of states, jurisdictional concerns addressed by the framework of analysis
provided by the principle of subsidiarity have a central role to assess, guide
and constrain transnational legal practice." 03
If, as argued here, citizens in modern democracies do indeed influence
foreign policy decision- making, two important issues arise: when is such
delegation appropriate at the international level and what good reasons exist
for such delegation? Several authors who address the issue in the European
Union context have framed the issue in economic efficiency terms. According
to the standard theory, the choice is between decentralization and
centralization. The argument for decentralization is to better accommodate
citizens' preferences. 04 Centralization, on the other hand, is warranted when
externalities are present or when sufficient economies of scale and scope can
be gained at a higher level of organization. 0 5 Thus, the citizens of a country
might prefer to delegate a particular governmental function to the
international level when the benefits gained from internalizing externalities,
or from obtaining greater economies of scope and scale, outweigh the loss of
influence over a particular issue on the domestic level. 106
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Ederveen, Gelauff & Pelkmans, supra note 98, at 22; Joachim Ahrens, Martin Meurers &
Carsten Renner, Who Shall Decide What? Citizens' Attitudes Towards Political Decision Making
in the EU, in SUBSIDIARITY & ECONOMIC REFORM IN EUROPE 41 (George Gelauff, Isabel Grilo &
Arjan Lejour eds., 2008) ("Public goods[,] the demand for which is based on heterogeneous
preferences across countries[] should rather be provided at national or even local levels of
policymaking.").
105 Emanuela Carbonara, Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, The Optimal Territorial Scope of
Laws, in THE ECONOMICS OF LAWMAKING 51, 57-62 (Francesco Parisi & Vincy Fon eds., 2009);
Ederveen, Gelauff & Pelkmans, sutpra note 98, at 22; Ahrens, Meurers & Renner, supra note 104,
at 41. Ederveen et al. assert, however, that even if externalities and economies of scale are
present, centralization is not required if there is a credible prospect that states will cooperate
with one another on the issue at hand. Ederveen, Gelauff & Peikmans, supra note 98, at 25.
Some literature accounts for what is viewed as a mismatch between the predictions of the
standard theory and the actual allocations of governmental functions between the European
Union and the Member States. See Ahrens, Meurers & Renner, supra note 104; Carbonara,
Luppi & Parisi, supra; Ederveen, Gelauff & Pelkmans, supra note 98.
106 A similar calculation is made when citizens weigh the loss of direct control over policy matters
against the benefits to be gained from delegating them to representatives or to experts, or the
benefits to be gained from adopting pre-commitment strategies. For further discussion of
delegation and its benefits and costs, see Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of
International Delegation, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2008). The European Parliament presents
an interesting wrinkle in this discussion. Members of the European Parliament are elected by
direct universal suffrage on the national level. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing
the European Community, art. 190, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
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The decision whether to delegate government functions to higher levels of
organization can be represented in the model developed in Part III by
modifying the figures used there. In Figure 4 below, the analysis moves from
the domestic to the international level. To simplify, assume that there are
only two countries, Country A, whose preference map is illustrated above in
Figure 1, and a new Country Z. Assume that the preferences of the citizens of
Country Z are homogeneous and therefore can be represented by a single
circle, Z. Centralization essentially has the effect of adding group Z's
preferences to what now can be understood as an international map of citizen
preferences. Suppose for illustration, 19D represents the optimal point that
Country A reached at the domestic level. If Country Z has preferences that
are more conservative on a particular issue than 0 D' then the optimal point
from an international perspective will move away from more liberal







0 20 40 60 so 10C
Figure 4
Note here that the introduction of Country Z results in the move to el
because its preferences are being weighted in the same way that the citizens
of Country A's preferences are being weighted, that is, according to group size
and intensity. Although this is not the way that decisions are weighted at the
international level,' 07 for purposes of this discussion, this Article illustrates
However, they may form themselves into political groups on the transnational level. Id. at art.
191; Decision of the European Parliament of 28 September 2005 Adopting the Statute for
Members of the European Parliament 2005/684, art. 8(l), 2005 O.J. (L 262) 1, 3 (EC). The
Parliament thus provides a means by which policy preferences can in theory be expressed
directly on the international level, as opposed to the system that we focus on in this paper, in
which policy positions that were developed on the domestic level are then intermediated by the
state to the international level. For a discussion of the impact of party organization on the voting
patterns of representatives in the European Parliament, see Simon Hix, Abdul Noury & Gdrard
Roland, Dimensions of Politics in the European Parliament, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 494 (2006). These
authors conclude that the voting behavior of Parliament members falls mostly along traditional
left-right lines and not along positions taken by the national governments. Id. at 599.
107 Voting systems weighted by population have been considered but rejected as politically
unacceptable. WERNER J. FELD, ROBERT S. JORDAN & LEON HURWITZ, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 135 (3d ed. 1994). A number of procedures are
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the decision-making method which best accommodates the preferences of
citizens as individuals.
As discussed above, the argument for decentralization is to better
accommodate group preferences. One would expect that the heterogeneity of
preferences increases as the scope of representation increases with
centralization. 10 8 The reduction in total utility that results from the increase
in heterogeneity of preferences is captured in Equation 3, where G is the
governing authority. 109
M
U, (6 G) -- ym (Xm - 6 G)2 + __G
II
Equation 3
The optimal degree of centralization weighs the utility reductions from
increasing heterogeneity of preferences against the cost efficiencies gained
from economies of scale and scope. 110 In its simplest form, the subsidiarity
cost test can be expressed as:
CC < CR + CR
Equation 4
Where Cc is equal to total costs at the central level and CR equals the
costs at each regional level, respectively.' Therefore,
CC - (CR + CR) 5 0
Equation 5
The cost savings from centralization can be expressed simply as AC. As
discussed above, these cost savings must be balanced against the loss of
aggregate utility that results from the increase in heterogeneity of
preferences, as decision-making is centralized away from the local level.
followed at the international level, including unanimity, majority vote with equality of voting
power, various forms of qualified majorities, weighted voting, veto rights, and consensus. See
generally id. at 133-37; ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 15 1-62 (2007); PHILIPPE SANDS & PIERRE KLEIN, BOWE'rI's LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS 263-67 (5th ed. 2001).
108 However, there might be instances when the position taken at the international or centralized
level more closely approximates the preferences of at least some groups at the domestic level.
109 G may take on the value of C at the central level, R at the regional level, and N at the national
level.
110 Carbonara, Luppi & Parisi, supra note 105, at 52.
M1 For a discussion of cost reductions from the economies of scale and scope derived from
centralization, see id. at 57-59. This Article assumes that the cost advantage of internalizing
externalities is captured by these cost variables.
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While this decrease in utility can be expressed simply as AU, it becomes
necessary to assign a monetary value to weigh the loss of utility that
represents the gap between citizen preferences and government policy
positions, against the cost savings gained through centralization. Otherwise,
standing alone the two variables are incommensurate. The subsidiarity
test 112 thus becomes AC 5 pAU, 113 where p represents the valuation
parameter.
The mathematical simplicity of this subsidiarity test conceals the
complex issues involved in assigning a monetary value to p. In essence, p
represents society's willingness to trade individual freedom (as represented
by a person's ability to have her preferences reflected in government policy
that will have coercive effect) for the cost efficiencies gained through
centralization. There is of course a strong argument that society has already
implicitly assigned a value to p in the real world because decisions are made
routinely to centralize or decentralize. 1 1 4 Through this process of rational
decision-making, p is revealed. At the same time, there is also an argument
that p is meaningless because it purports to represent the value of human
freedom when the value of such freedom might be infinite; thus, even if it is
possible to monetize the value of the loss of freedom, the issue is whether a
democratic society is ever justified in assigning such a value to individuals'
rights to choose.115
B. State Participation in International Decision-Making
In a way, the prospect that citizens of democracies do in fact impact
foreign policy at the national level serves only to underline the legitimacy
problem that this Article described in Part 11. As democratization increases
within nations, it becomes increasingly difficult to legitimately ignore the
preferences of those states as they interact with other international actors.
This is not just because of the independence of nation states in the classical
sense, but also because those states do in fact reflect the choices of their
112 In addition to the economic cost savings expressed by Carbonara, Luppi, and Parisi. the
subsidiarity test adopted here also takes into account the loss of utility discussed above.
113 It might appear counterintuitive that tIC be less than or equal to pAU, but this is because cost
and utility reductions result in negative values for AC and AU. Thus, higher values (less
negative) for AU indicate less utility loss; lower values (greater negative) for AC indicate greater
cost savings.
114 For a discussion of Revealed Preference Theory, see Paul Samuelson, A Note on the Pure
Theory of Consumers'Behaviour, 5 ECONOMICA 61 (1938).
11 See Carbonara, Luppi & Parisi, supra note 105. Carbonara, Luppi and Parisi argue that other
dynamics can influence greater centralization. Id. They show that due to the path-driven nature
of centralization, a norm that requires centralization in some instances and not in others could
create a dynamic in favor of centralization even though the standard theory would not call for it.
Id. For a full discussion of the relationship between rational decision-making and substantive
freedom, see AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM 76-81 (2001).
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citizens. To ignore a particular state on the international plane may well
mean dismissing the wishes of millions of people. Yet the problem is complex
if what Weiler observes is true.116
Weiler argues that the forms of governance emerging from international
law have changed over time."17 International governance first arose out of
bilateral transactions between states, mainly in the form of treaties where
state consent is at the fore. 118 Then constitutional and legislative forms
emerged, such as the United Nations and the European Union, 119 which
introduced the possibility of creating and pursuing policies contrary to the
aims of Member States. Finally, international governance has more recently
taken the form of regulation, where there is neither government nor
governed. 20 As Weiler puts it, none of these "strata" of law and governance
has disappeared through the evolution: all three forms combined constitute
the "geology" of international law.'12 1
Such complexity is on full display in the efforts to respond to the global
economic crisis. A few preliminary remarks are in order. It is of course
impossible to make definitive statements here because events are still
unfolding. Further, this Article does not speak to the substantive merits of
the various proposals for fiscal, monetary, and regulatory coordination.
However, given this Article's findings that citizens influence foreign policy, it
is worth using the lens of citizen influence, even if in a tentative way, to
examine the processes by which highly contested solutions will be reached. It
is also appropriate to address the present crisis because such an examination
shows how difficult decision-making is within a particular substantive area.
On the one hand, citizen preferences may be irrelevant to the realm of
finance and economics as a descriptive matter and should be as a normative
matter. These areas are technical and thus are prime candidates for
delegation to experts. Further, because of the technical nature of financial
and economic policy and because their impacts are so diffuse and far-
reaching, decisions about such policies arguably should be insulated from
outside pressure from either particular interest groups or citizens as a whole.
Finally, financial and economic governance seems to warrant greater
coordination or centralization because of the intertwined world economy, the
presence of externalities, and the potential for economies of scale and scope.
116 See Weiler, supra note 8.
117 Id. at 552.
118 Id. at 553.
119 Id. at 556.
120 Id. at 559-61.
12 Weiler, supra note 8, at 551-53.
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On the other hand, the state of the economy is often the determinative
factor in the outcome of an election, and the current crisis has grown to such
a scale and scope that it cannot be ignored. The public is now at least
minimally aware of credit default obligations (which experts themselves have
difficulty understanding), credit rating agencies, and structured finance.
Furthermore, notwithstanding attempts to insulate economic policymaking
from outside influence, there are critics who argue that such influence is
present, 122 the very thing about which Dahl and Moravcsik are concerned. 123
These considerations mean that the public is engaged in these issues and
may well become more concerned about them. Thus, the global financial crisis
shows how different strands of decision-making, popular consent,
representation, delegation to experts, and insulation become entangled. It
also reminds us that we must place the aggregation of citizen preferences in
context with the other tools for making decisions at any level, but with a
greater appreciation for its power.
As of this writing, most of the policies at issue are being formulated (to
expand Weiler's lexicon) at the substratum of international law, i.e., the state
level.124 Substantive fiscal, monetary, and regulatory policy is implemented
primarily within countries. 25 Locating this activity on the domestic level is
not surprising given what has been discussed in this Article. In democracies,
leaders who are addressing these issues will eventually answer to their
constituencies for the actions they take now, even though this is somewhat
qualified because important aspects of financial policy have been delegated to
independent entities such as the Federal Reserve Board.'12 6 At the same time,
international coordination seems warranted to internalize externalities, to
prevent free riding, and to take advantage of economies of scope and scale,
which gives rise to various forms of international governance. 127 The
international financial system and proposed reforms are too complex to
discuss here in this Article. Instead, the Article focuses on the G20's decision
to use the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"') as the primary financial
122 Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup, THE ATLANTIC, May 2009, available at http://www.the
atlantic.com/doc/200905/imf-advice (arguing that the financial services industry is hindering the
necessary response to the financial crisis).
123 See supra notes 66-73.
124 Stephen Grenville, Does the Global Financial Crisis Need a Domestic or International
Response? E. ASIA F., Feb. 10, 2009, available at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/02/ 10/does-
the -global-financial-crisis-nee d-a-do mestic-or-internation al-respo nse/#more -17 74.
125Id.
126 Yet, even in this context, the recent controversy over the reappointment of the chair of the
Board indicates that such delegation cannot be fully insulated from the political process. Sewell
Chan, Fed Chief Wins a Second Term Despite Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010, at Al.
127 Recall, however, that coordination among states concerning a particular governmental
function is not the same thing as centralizing that function. See Ederveen, Gelauff & Pellimans,
supra note 98, at 25.
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intermediary for international assistance to small and medium-sized
economies during the crisis.128
This renewed attention to the IMF is being paid just as the institution
has been responding to criticism from a number of sources. In the past, critics
have questioned its policies when acting as a lender of last resort to condition
assistance on the borrower's acceptance of what are often viewed as onerous
and intrusive internal structural adjustment commitments. This criticism
became particularly sharp during the Asian Debt Crisis of the late 1990S.1 29
Such criticism of the IMF's substantive policy has been accompanied by
questions about IIF governance. 30 Dijkstra identifies two areas of concern
in this regard. First, he and others have argued that the current voting
system, which ties voting power to a member state's quota of special drawing
rights, 131 does not accurately reflect the relative economic strength of its
members, particularly that of emerging economies, and leads to the
disproportionate dominance of richer countries over poorer ones.132 Dijkstra
128 Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors [G20], The Global Plan for
Recovery and Reform, paras. 17-21, Apr. 2, 2009, available at http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/
resources/en/PDF/final-communique [hereinafter Global Plan for Recovery and Reform].
129 The literature on the Asian Debt Crisis and the IMF response is extensive. A general overview
can be found in Roman Terrill, The Promises & Perils of Globalization, in THE E-BOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (2007), available at http://www.uiowa.edu/
ifdebooklebook2/PDFFiles/Part_3_4.pdf; see also Roman Terrill, 1998/1999 Update: The Asian
Crisis Goes Global, in THE E-BOOK ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (2007).
130 There is extensive literature on the governance of the IMF and the controversies raised by its
lending activities. See, e.g., Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], Comm. on IMF Governance Reform,
Final Report, Mar. 24, 2009, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/2009/govrefl
032409.pdf; Geske Dijkstra, Supranational Governance and the Challenge of Democracy: The
IMF and the World Bank, in GOVERNANCE AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT: ASSESSING THE
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF GOVERNANCE PRACTICES 269 (Victor Bekkers et al. eds., 2007); IMF,
Indep. Evaluation Office, Governance of the IMF: An Evaluation, May 21, 2008, available at
http://www.ieo-imf.org/eval/complete/pdfl05212008/CGmain.pdf; Devesh Kapor & Moises Naim,
The IMF and Democratic Governance, 16 J. DEM. 89 (2005); REFORMING THE GOVERNANCE OF
THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK (Ariel Buria & J.A. Ocampo eds., 2005); PETERSON INST. FOR
INT'L ECON., REFORMING THE IMF FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, SPECIAL REPORT 19 (Edwin M.
Truman ed., 2005); Hector R. Torres, Reforming the International Monetary Fund-Why Its
Legitimacy Is at Stake, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 443 (2007).
131 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art. XII, sec. 5, Dec. 27, 1945, 60
Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter IMF Articles of Agreement]. Currently, each member is
given a set number of basic votes plus votes based on the member's quota, which are assigned
based on each members' economic size and other economic characteristics. Id.; IMF, IMF Quotas,
Factsheet, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2010). A
member's quota is represented in the form of special drawing rights ("SDRs"). IMF Articles of
Agreement, art. III, sec. 1. The SDR is an "artificial" unit of exchange, based on a basket of
currencies, which represents a member's claim to real foreign currency. Id. art. XV; IMF, Special
Drawing Rights, Feb. 2009, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm. The
IMF member states may, subject to certain conditions, use SDRs to purchase currency to address
balance of payment or reserve needs. IMF Articles of Agreement, art. XIX.
132 Dijkstra, supra note 130, at 279-80; Vijay L. Kelkar et al., Reforming the International
Monetary Fund: Towards Enhanced Accountability and Legitimacy, in REFORMING GOVERNANCE
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also argues that the organizational structure of the IMF and the changes in
its mission-from regulating foreign exchange rates to monitoring its
member states' economic policies and providing crisis management-has led
to a strong bureaucratic culture unaccountable to its member states. 1 33 Such
criticisms have led to reforms aimed at greater transparency and more
meaningful exchanges between the IiMF and nongovernmental
organizations. 134 Furthermore, in 2008, as part of the process of "quota and
voice reforms" that began in 2006, the IMF proposed amendments to the
Articles of Agreement to adjust member voting power. 135 The G20 nations
have committed to implementing these reforms and have called on the IMF to
complete the next review of quotas by January 2011.136 These proposed
changes in governance accompanied the announcement that adjustments will
OF THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK 45 (Ariel Buira & J.A. Ocampo eds., 2005); Torres, supra note
130, at 445.
133 Dijkstra, supra note 130, at 2 79-80.
134 Id. at 284.
135 Press Release, IMF, IMF Board of Governors Adopts Quota and Voice Reforms by Large
Margin (Apr. 29, 2008), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2008/prO893.htm;
IMF, Acceptances of the Proposed Amendments of the Articles of Agreement, Feb. 25, 2010,
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/misc/consents.htm. The proposed amendments
would triple the number of basic votes, ensure that the ratio between basic votes and votes based
on a member's quota would remain constant, and enable each of the two Executive Directors who
represent African countries to appoint an additional Alternate Director. IMF, Executive Bd. to
the Bd. of Governors, Reform of Quota and Voice in the International Monetary Fund, at 5-6,
Mar. 28, 2008, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng2008/032108.pdf. In addition,
the method for calculating quotas would be changed to allow for greater transparency and to
better reflect the economic strength of emerging economies. Id. at 2; IMF, List of IMF Quota and
Voice Publications: June 2006-Apr. 2008, http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/quotas/pubs/ (last
visited Feb. 3, 2010). For a more recent discussion of some of the proposed reforms, see IMF,
Strategy, Policy, & Review Dep't & Legal Dep't, IMF Governance-Summary of Issues and
Reform Options, July 1, 2009, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/07
0109.pdif.
136 Global Plan for Recovery and Reform, supra note 128, para. 20. More recently, the G20 has
recommended that at least 5 percent of quotas be shifted from overrepresented countries to
underrepresented emerging markets and developing countries. G20, Leaders' Statement: The
Pittsburg Summit, para. 21, Sept. 24-25, 2009, available at http://www.pittshurghsumm
it.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm [hereinafter G20 Pittsburgh Statement]. In October 2009, the
advisory group to the IIMF Board of Governors endorsed the G20's recommendation. IMF,
Communiqug of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the Board of Governors
of the International Monetary Fund, para. 4, Oct. 4, 2009, available at http://www.imf.org/ext
ernal/np/cm/2009/100409.htm. The G20 also agrees that "the beads and senior leadership of the
international financial institutions should be appointed through an open, transparent, and
merit-based selection process." Global Plan for Recovery and Reform, supra note 128; G20
Pittsburgh Statement, para. 21. According to Johnson, this means that the managing
directorship of the IMF, an influential position that has traditionally been appointed by
European countries, will now be open to persons from emerging economies. Simon Johnson, The
Last European: Why the G-20 Was a Success, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2009, available at http://
economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/03/why-the-g-20-was-a-success-obamas-initiative/.
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be made in the conditions placed on IMF loans, including the removal of
structural performance criteria. 137
If the G20's call for additional funding to the IMF is realized, the IMF
will effectively have a trillion dollars on hand to assist embattled countries, 138
which would bolster the IMFs importance internationally, at the same time
highlighting the legitimacy issues discussed in Part II. In this respect,
Weiler's treatment of the legitimacy problems associated with international
governance is interesting because he anticipates the findings of this Article.
Weiler argues that where international governance takes its institutional or
regulatory forms, the "usual fall back position that. ... legitimacy may .. . be
acquired through democratic control of foreign policy at the nation state
level-loses its persuasive power."139 According to Weiler, at the institutional
level, this loss in power is due to the loss of meaningful state consent. 140 In
his view, in large international institutions, state consent must be
fictionalized to accommodate all members, and membership in some
institutions, such as the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), is not really
optional.41 At the level of regulation, Weiler argues that democratic
justifications for policy lose their persuasive power because all accounts of
democracy presuppose a demos and an identifiable government, neither of
which is present at the international regulatory level. 142
While there are some international institutional and regulatory regimes,
like the WTO, in which states are arguably highly constrained, that is not
necessarily the case with the IIMF, at least in some respects. Some evidence
supports the argument that state consent remains relevant. 143 The recently
implemented or proposed reforms discussed above indicate that international
institutions, like the IMF, recognize that states, to the extent that they are
137 Press Release, IMF, IMF Overhauls Nonconcessional Lending Facilities and Conditionality
(Apr. 3, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pI/2009/pnO940.htm.
138 Global Plan for Recovery and Reform, supra note 128, para. 5.
139 Weiler, supra note 8, at 560; see also Kumm, supra note 3.
140 Weiler, supra note 8, at 557.
141 Id. at 557-58. Heifer explains that there is a strong incentive to enter into and continue free
trade agreements such as the WTO, because membership is required to enjoy the "club goods"
provided by such arrangements. Laurence L. Heifer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1636-
37 (2005).
142 Weiler, supra note 8, at 560. With regard to international financial regulation, Jan Kregel
argues that poorer countries are not represented at various international rulemaking bodies that
have quasi-legal status and whose members are not elected. In Kregel's view, such bodies, like
the Financial Stability Forum (now the Financial Stability Board), form a de facto regulatory
power that impacts developing countries. Jan Kregel, From Monterrey to Basel: W~ho Rules the
Banks?, in SOC. WATCH, REPORT 2006, IMPOSSIBLE ARCHITECTURE: WHY THE FINANCIAL
STRUCTURE Is NOT WORKING FOR THE POOR AND HOW To REDESIGN IT FOR EQUITrY AND
DEVELOPMENT 26 (2006).
143 See supra notes 8-9.
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able, will balk at acceding to policies over which they have little or no control.
Likewise, international institutions must respond to this resistance or risk
being sidelined. In this regard, Torres argues that the effectiveness of IMF
policies and the legitimacy of its governance are closely linked. Writing in
2007, Torres observed that the IMF was increasingly beset by its inability to
"persuad[e] large members to follow its policy advice," and by the fact that
potential borrowers were engaging in self help-accumulating their own
foreign exchange reserves and pooling these reserves within regional
institutions. 144 For Torres, what he terms the "two deficits" in effectiveness
and legitimacy "are interlinked in a vicious circle as ultimately '[t]he Fund's
credibility depends on its perceived legitimacy as an international
organization representative of its members and [its] effectiveness suffers if
countries of growing economic importance are not adequately
reprsentd."'145
This Article does not assess whether the IIMF reforms as implemented or
proposed will allay the concerns of observers. However, two things are of
note. First, although it can be argued that state consent has been besieged of
late, such consent remains important, as Torres observes. 146 As the IMF
example illustrates, state consent can become the basis upon which states
either support or undermine international institutions and the norms and
policies that emerge from them. To be sure, such state behavior can be
construed in realist terms. However, state behavior might also be explained
by the fact that, at least for democracies, citizen preferences about foreign
policy matters on the domestic level cannot be ignored as a source of
legitimization, even on the international level.
Second, the example of the IMF might present one way in which the work
done in this Article might be further applied to the international level. Even
though institutions like the EIF are far removed from the ordinary citizen,
and even though their leadership is not subject to direct elections, if an
institution wishes to perform its mission effectively, it must anticipate the
preferences of its constituents with regard to both substance and process.
Otherwise, states will try to either depart from or undermine the very
purposes of that institution. This lends further support to the claims that
accountability exists even when international institutions are involved, 1 47
and therefore, the preferences of citizens, as articulated by their
governments, indirectly have some influence on the international plane.
144 Torres, supra note 130, at 444.
145 Id. at 445 (quoting Rodrigo de Rato y Figaredo, The IMF's Medium-Term Strategy: Meeting
the Needs of Emerging Market Members, Remarks at the Banco de Mexico, Mexico City (Mar.
23, 2006)).
146 See id.
147 See supra notes 5-7.
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to assess what role the aggregation of citizen
preferences into the foreign policy choices of a democratic country might play
in the legitimization of international law. Although such aggregation cannot
be an exclusive source of legitimization, and is not the sole characteristic of a
democracy, it also cannot be ignored. This Article has reviewed the literature
and applied an anticipated reaction model to show that even in large
democracies there are mechanisms through which citizen preferences can be,
and are, reflected in the policy choices of their representatives. Policymakers
therefore must anticipate what those preferences will be when it comes time
to be held accountable.
As proposed in Part II, there is a sense in which one can draw a line
between the preferences of an individual citizen to the choices made on the
state level, although as demonstrated in Part III, such a line is far from
direct. In Part IV, this Article has shown, in a preliminary way, that there is
some reason to believe that line continues from the state to the international
level, in the sense that citizen preferences remain relevant to state decisions
regarding whether to centralize or decentralize, and whether a state will
support or undermine the mission of international institutions. Thus,
citizens' influence must be taken into account as those institutions make
their own substantive and procedural choices. Determining how bright or
faint that line is must await further research, but hopefully the findings here
indicate it is a line worth tracing.
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